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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

GERALD STEVEN WALLACE,:

Case No. 20040877-CA

Defendant/Appellant,

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for three counts of securities
fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated sections 61-1-1 and
61-1-21 (2000), and one count each of selling an unregistered security, a third degree
felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-21 (2000), selling a
security without a licensed, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated
sections 61-1-3 and 61-1-21 (2000), and pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree
felony under Utah Code Annotated sections 76-10-1601 and 76-10-1605 (2003). Utah
Code Annotated section 78-2a-3(e) (2002) provides this Court jurisdiction over criminal
convictions other than first degree felonies.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS
1. Utah law punishes "willful" violations of securities laws. Willful is the highest
form of mental state in Utah. Mr. Wallace honestly represented the legitimacy of
securities only after he had observed the investments operate as advertised for 18 months,
and his reliance on the opinions of a former Utah Supreme Court justice as well as
several lawyers, bankers, real estate agents, regulatory officials, and police officers. Did
the State present sufficient evidence of a willful intent to commit securities violations?
In reviewing cases for sufficient evidence, this Court will reverse a conviction
when the jury bases its verdict on inferences that merely support remote or speculative
possibilities of guilt. Spanish Fork City v. Brvan. 1999 UT App 61, «f5, 975 P.2d 501.
This issue also requires this Court to construe the meaning of the statutory term
"willfully." Interpreting a statute presents a question of law which this Court reviews for
correctness. State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Defense counsel failed to preserve this issue by not objecting to the sufficiency of
the evidence based on the lack of intent. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, |16, 10 P.3d
346. Defense counsel is ineffective when counsel acts below an objective standard of
reasonableness and the deficient performance prejudices the defendant. State v.
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Criminal defendants may challenge trial
counsel's effectiveness for the first time on appeal when different counsel represent them
and the appellate record is adequate. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^[16, 12 P.3d 92.
2

2. Under Utah law, trial judges must terminate probation after 36 months. The
trial judge sentenced Mr. Wallace to serve 144 months on probation. Did the trial judge
illegally extend probation beyond the statutory maximum period?
An illegal sentence presents a question of law on appeal State v. Montoya, 825
P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). B ecause courts can correct an illegal sentence at
any time, Mr. Wallace properly raises this issue for the first time on appeal. IcL; Utah R.
Crim. P. 22(e) (2004).

STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND COURT RULES
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3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 9, 2002, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Wallace and
three others with several securities violations and racketeering activ ity. R. 1. The State
charged Mr. Wallace with three counts of securities fraud, one count of sale of an
unregistered security, one count of sale of a security by an unlicensed broker, and a
pattern of an unlawful activity. R. 3-8. The trial court held a jury trial on August 10
through 12, 2004. R. 412-14.] In defense of the charges, Mr. Wallace relied on his and
others' efforts to ensure the legitimacy of the investment program, his sincere belief in
the program's legitimacy, and his honest efforts in marketing the program. R. 413: 35357, 368-70.
During jury deliberations, the jurors sent the trial judge several questions
requesting additional evidence about Mr. Wallace's involvement in the alleged fraud. R.
414: 453. The trial judge instructed the jurors to rely on the evidence presented at trial.
Id at 453-56. The jury convicted Mr. Wallace of all of the charges. IcL at 456-57. On
September 27, 2004, the trial judge sentenced Mr. Wallace to prison terms on all of the
charges and ordered the sentences to run consecutively. R. 415: 10-11; Addendum A.
But, the judge suspended the prison terms and placed Mr. Wallace on probation for 12
years. I d at 11. Mr. Wallace filed a timely notice of appeal on October 7, 2004. R. 390.

'Volumes 412, 413, and 414 contain the trial transcripts. The sentencing hearing
transcript is included in volume 415. This brief refers to the internal page numbers of
those volumes by "R." and the volume number.
4

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State accused Mr. Wallace of securities violations and racketeering for
facilitating three home purchases from willing buyers and then conditioning the sales on
the buyers investing approximately $200,000 in a fund that guaranteed a healthy return.
The State claimed that the fund, generically called "the Program," was actually a Ponzi
scheme in which new investors would pay earlier investors a return. R. 413: 360-61.
The State did not allege that Mr. Wallace was one of the masterminds behind the
Program. Rather, it contended that Mr. Wallace failed to adequately investigate the
legitimacy of the Program, accurately describe to investors how the Program worked, and
disclose material information to investors. R. 414: 422-26. But, the State's witnesses
agreed that Mr. Wallace acted in good faith. R. 412: 140-41, 160-61, 203-05, 213. In
fact, he was so sure that the Program was legal and legitimate, he bough one house
himself and then enlisted his brother and sister to buy one home each. R. 413: 254-55,
370.
Mr. Wallace learned of the Program from a friend named Alvin Anderson who
was one of the masterminds behind the scheme. R. 413: 299-300, 371. Anderson
represented that he knew a man named Paul Stewart who had inside information on
money transfers between banks. IcL Specifically, federal law requires banks to hold in
reserve a minimum and maximum percentage of assets in cash. Id. at 371-72.
Sometimes, banks fall above or below the required thresholds. Id Mr. Stewart claimed
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that he could "facilitate" transactions between banks by taking money from banks that
had too much cash reserves and sending it to banks that had too little. Id at 372. But,
Stewart represented that he could only complete the transfers and receive a commission
for his services if he had cash deposited in a bank equal to the amount of the transfers.
Id. According to Stewart, although the banks would have no security interest in the
money, they would only authorize him to transfer the funds if he could show he had the
money to back the transactions. Id Based on the millions of dollars involved, Mr.
Stewart promised a high return. Id.
To generate capital to authorize the transfers, Anderson and his associates bought
houses from willing home sellers who had significant amounts of equity in their homes.
R. 412: 86-89, 149-50, 182. These "buyers" would condition sales on the sellers
investing a large portion of their equity in the Program for two years. Id The sellers
would then invest a significant portion of the equity in the Program. Id In return, the
Program promised to repay investors within two years the total amount invested plus the
equivalent of, at least, eight percent interest, amortized over 30 years. Id
The Program required the sellers/investors to close sales at a title company located
in Salt Lake City named Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund ("Attorney's Title"). Id at 8688. The agreement listed L. Dale McAllister as the title officer and escrow agent for
Attorney's Title. Id at 89, 149, 182. McAllister actually worked for an attorney named
Clay Harrison who was one of Attorney's Title's managers. R. 413: 282. As the escrow
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agent, McAllister would allegedly deposit sellers' investments in Harrison's attorney
trust account. Id. at 284. Stewart would then facilitate the bank transfers based on the
amount of money in the trust account. Id. at 372.
Due to the high return that Stewart promised, the Program offered to pay the
mortgage payments for the home buyers that Anderson recruited. Id. at 361-62. After
five years, Anderson promised to pay off the recruits' entire mortgages and give them the
homes free of charge. IdL Despite the promise of free homes, Mr. Wallace rejected
Anderson's recruitment pitch. Id at 372.
Anderson participated in purchasing homes himself and employed a real estate
agent named Calvin Udy who operated out of Davis County. Id at 249-50. While
assisting Anderson, Udy ran into his former employer in the real estate business, Steve
Brough. Id at 227-28, 262. Brough had previously encountered some home buyers who
had engaged in loan fraud to purchase homes involving similar arrangements like the
Program. Id at 224-25. Brough became suspicious of those transactions because, in his
own experience, Utah law forbids trustees from earning interest on trust accounts or
using trust funds for investment. Id at 225-26. Brough informed Udy that based on
these concerns he had reported the other transactions to the FBI. Id. at 224-26.
When Brough learned that Udy was helping Anderson with similar contracts, he
arranged for Udy to discuss the matter with the FBI. I d at 227-28. An investigator for
the Utah Insurance Commission also attended the meeting. Id at 262. Although FBI
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agents warned Brough and Udy about possible loan fraud, they stated that the investment
agreements were legally "meaningless." Id at 262-63. But, the agents would not
disclose any details because their investigation was ongoing. Id at 227, 263.
Subsequently, Udy met with Anderson and Stewart to discuss his concerns. Id. at
264-65. When Udy mentioned the FBI investigation, Stewart dismissed it as
inconsequential. Id. at 265. Nevertheless, Udy refused to assist Anderson with any more
deals until the FBI completed its investigation. Id.
Eventually, Udy resolved his concerns and arranged for two purchases under the
Program. I d Before closing the deals, Udy asked the FBI agent in charge of the
investigation if he should kill the deals. Id The agent said no and asked Udy if he
would wear a recording device when the deals closed. Id Although Udy agreed to do
so, he did not attend the closings. WL at 265-66. Udy became so confident in the
Program that he actually bought a home himself to recruit an investor. I d at 255-58.
Over the course of 18 months, Mr. Wallace observed that Anderson appeared to
be earning a lot of money from the Program. Anderson had "all the trappings of
success," including an expensive home and a luxury car. R. 412: 66-67. He even
involved his own children in the Program and they seemed to be enjoying the same
success. I d Mr. Wallace also contacted the first person who had sold a home to
Anderson and she confirmed that the Program operated just as Anderson had advertised.
Id. She even stated that she would sell another home to Anderson if she could. Ld
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Based on these assurances, Mr. Wallace agreed to become a home buyer for Anderson.

14
Sometime in the late 1990's, Anderson introduced Mr. Wallace to Udy. IcL at 359.
About this time, Udy apparently had re-joined the Brough real estate agency. Anderson
accompanied Mr. Wallace as they house hunted to teach him how to find homes for the
Program. R. 412: 97; 413: 365. Before Mr. Wallace completed any purchases, Udy
informed him about the FBI's pending investigation and its conclusion that the
investment contracts were legally meaningless. R. 413: 262-64. Presumably, Udy also
disclosed his and Brough's own investigations, including their contacts with state
regulatory agencies. IdL Mr. Wallace responded to this information by stating that he
"wanted to make sure that they didn't do anything that was illegal...." Id. at 264.
Because both Udy and Brough remained cautious about the Program, they
questioned Mr. Wallace and Anderson how the Program earned money. Id at 226, 252.
Mr. Wallace and Anderson explained that the investments involved bank transfers and
they assured them that no money would be removed from the trust account or
encumbered in any way. kL at 226-28, 252-53. But, Anderson refused to disclose the
exact details because he joked that if he did Udy and Brough would be able to conduct
their own bank transfers without needing Anderson's assistance. Id at 227.
Mr. Wallace's first home purchase involved a house in Layton, Utah owned by
Richard Van Roo. R. 412: 91. Mr. Wallace offered to purchase the home on August 3,
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2000. Id Van Roo had contracted with the Brough real estate agency to sell the home.
Id. at 82. Before responding to Mr. Wallace's offer, Van Roo expressed his reservations
about the offer's unusual terms to Brough. R. 413: 229. Brough informed him about his
previous experiences with other fraudulent deals, told Van Roo about the FBI
investigation, and agreed that Van Roo should have an attorney look at the offer. R. 412:
91-92, 96-97; R. 413: 229.
Brough sent the purchase offer and accompanying investment agreement to the
FBI. R. 413: 241-42. Again, the FBI did not inform Brough to nix the deal. Id. at 24445. Brough then sent the offer to the Utah Real Estate Commission. Id. at 243. Like the
FBI, the Real Estate Commission expressed no concerns about the legality of the
agreement. IcL at 243-44, 276. The only risk appeared to be the good faith of the
persons who held the investment money in trust. Id at 269.
Based on these assurances, Brough informed Van Roo that if the money was held
in a trust account the only way he could foresee a risk was "if somebody dipped into the
trust fund against the law." Id at 245-46. In fact, although Brough never felt
comfortable about the proposed investment agreement, both he and Udy had refused to
complete other offers which caused them concerns. Id at 232, 278. Brough even
thoroughly reviewed all closing documents that listed Attorney's Title or its employees
as trustees for the investment money. Id at 235-36. Nevertheless, both Brough and Udy
felt good enough about the offer to see it through to completion. Id. at 236.
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Over the course of several weeks, Van Roo investigated Attorney's Title and
determined that it was a legitimate business. R. 412: 90. He also presented the
investment agreement to numerous professionals, including his bank's vice-president, an
officer at another bank, a tax specialist, a real estate agent, and a lawyer. Id at 93-94,
130-36. Van Roo asked these persons to review the offer thoroughly because the equity
in his home represented his life savings and he was "scared to death" of losing it. Id. at
133-36. Each of these professionals concluded that the offer was unusual but not illegal
because the money would be held in a trust account. Id. at 94, 133-36. Further, no one
ever characterized the investment agreement as a security. Id. at 134-36.
On August 30, 2000, Van Roo met with his real estate agent, Udy, Anderson, and
Mr. Wallace. IcL at 97, 107. Anderson explained that the investment involved bank
loans that earned high interest rates but Anderson refused to disclose any more details.
Id. at 99-100. Mr. Wallace assured Van Roo that the investment was safe because it
involved a trust account. Id. at 108. Mr. Wallace personally guaranteed the safety of the
investment. Id
McAllister and Harrison were supposed to attend the meeting but they did not
show. Id. at 109. Accordingly, Van Roo arranged to meet with them the next day at
Attorney's Title. Ici The attorney who reviewed the investment contract had given Van
Roo a list of questions which Van Roo raised with McAllister and Harrison. Id. at 133.
After hearing their answers, Van Roo made a counter offer and the parties completed the
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agreement the following day. Id at 109-12.
After the close of the sale, Van Roo received payments from the Program. Id. at
122. But, within a couple of months, the checks that Anderson signed bounced. Id at
124-26, 140. Van Roo tried to contact Attorney's Title but the phone was always busy,
even on weekends. Id at 128.
In contrast, Mr. Wallace returned Van Roo's calls and tried to resolve Van Roo's
questions whenever a payment problem occurred. Id. at 123-27. Mr. Wallace even sent
Van Roo personal checks to cover payment shortages. Id. Further, all of Mr. Wallace's
checks were honored. I d at 140. In fact, Van Roo stated that Mr. Wallace "was always
very concerned" and treated him not just "reasonably well, [but] very well." Id at 140.
The second deal involved half of a duplex that David Fernau owned in Midway,
Utah. I d at 145. On September 20, 2000, Udy presented an offer from Mr. Wallace to
Fernau's real estate agent to purchase Fernau's half of the duplex. Id at 147-48.
Fernau's agent explained that the investment agreement involved some risk but he
assured Fernau that the money was safe in a trust account and that the house could not be
sold without his consent. Id at 152-53, 165. The agent added that the arrangement
appeared to be legitimate because similar transactions involving numerous
condominiums were about to close in Park City. Id at 172.
Fernau also presented the offer to retired Utah Supreme Court Justice Gordon
Hall. Id at 170. Justice Hall concluded that the agreement was "very unusual" but he
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did not advise Fernau whether to accept the offer. Id. Instead, Justice Hall contacted
Harrison at Attorney's Title to ensure that the deal was legitimate. Id. at 170-71.
Harrison assured the justice that all was legal. Id. at 171.
Just over a week after receiving the offer, Fernau accepted it including the terms
of the investment contract with Attorney's Title. Id. at 150-51. In accepting the deal,
Fernau had no discussions with Mr. Wallace. Id. at 153-54. But, through the real estate
agents he obtained a promissory note from Mr. Wallace. Id, at 160-61.
Fernau was scheduled to receive a payment from the Program in October 2001.
Id at 163. Before the due date, Mr. Wallace called Fernau and informed him that
someone had absconded with Fernau's money. Id This call apparently was the first
direct contact that Mr. Wallace had ever had with Fernau. Id. at 162-63. As a result of
the stolen funds, Fernau received no money from the sale of his home. Id. at 163.
The third transaction involved Sidney Creer who sold her condominium in
Midway. Id. at 176-77. The terms of Mr. Wallace's offer were familiar to Creer because
she was a licensed real estate agent and had seen similar investment agreements before.
Id. at 178, 182. In fact, she stated that she had worked with investors previously and was
"comfortable" with them generally and, in particular, with Mr. Wallace. Id. at 183.
Although Udy answered several questions for Creer, at one point, Udy suggested
that Creer raise her questions with Mr. Wallace. Id at 184. So, she prepared a list of
talking points and presented them to Mr. Wallace. Id at 184-86. Mr. Wallace explained
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the Program's history of success, that no trust account money was used for the monthly
payments, how the bank transfers generally worked, and that Stewart deposited the
proceeds from the investments locally in Zion's Bank. Id at 186-91. Mr. Wallace also
indicated that the buyers such as himself used the homes as rentals. Id. at 183.
Throughout the negotiations, Mr. Wallace was pleasant, never pressured Creer, and
answered all of her questions. Id. at 186, 212.
Additionally, Creer contacted three of Mr. Wallace's sellers and they all agreed
that the Program worked well. IdL at 188. One seller even stated that she was so pleased
with the Program that she sold a second home to Mr. Wallace. Id Creer also showed the
investment agreement to an attorney who specialized in real estate contracts. Id. at 190.
The attorney saw no legal problems with the agreement. Id at 211. He said that the only
possible hitch was if the trustee absconded with the money. Id The attorney also
advised Creer that the trustee would have insurance that would cover any losses in case
of fraud. Id Creer was familiar with this type of insurance because she had purchased
insurance herself during her career as a real estate agent. Id
After completing this investigation, Creer accepted the offer on or about January
3, 2001. Id. at 181. Before the closing, an issue arose which caused Creer to hesitate
about completing the transaction. Id at 201. Mr. Wallace was very understanding and
informed Creer that if "[a]t any time you feel uncomfortable, just let me know and it can
be stopped right there." Id at 201. Creer felt no pressure to proceed but did so anyway
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and closed the deal in March 2001. Id at 186, 201.
In October of 2001, Creer learned that the Program has stopped paying home
sellers. Id at 202. She called Mr. Wallace and he confirmed the problem and stated that
he was trying to raise additional funding. Id at 203. Mr. Wallace was very sorrowful
and sincerely wanted to "make it right." Id at 203, 213. Creer added that Mr. Wallace
was the only person who would accept her calls and try to return her money. Id.
After three months, Mr. Wallace could not recoup Creer's money. I d at 203. In
an effort to help Creer, Mr. Wallace had his sister, whose name was listed on the deed,
quit claimed the home back to Creer. Id at 189, 205. But, the mortgage company had a
lien on the house which prevented Creer from recovering it. Id at 206.
The State charged Mr. Wallace, Anderson, Harrison, and McAllister in a single
Information with numerous securities violations and racketeering. R. 1. The State
charged Mr. Wallace with three counts of securities fraud, one count of sale of an
unregistered security, one count of sale of a security by an unlicensed broker, and a
pattern of an unlawful activity. R.: 3-8. The State did not allege that Mr. Wallace was
one of the main players in the Program. Rather, it argued that Mr. Wallace failed to
disclose material information to sellers/investors. In particular, Mr. Wallace did not
inform investors that: (1) he had filed for bankruptcy in 1997; (2) the risks involved in
the Program; (3) Anderson had been convicted of a felony in 1986; (4) the Utah Division
of Securities had ordered Stewart to stop seeking investors in the Program; and, (5) some
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victims had filed suit against Attorney's Title in Duchense County in 2000. R. 412: 6772, 107-08; 414: 423-26.
At trial, Mr. Wallace testified that, contrary to the sellers' testimonies, he
disclosed the risks to investors. R. 413: 352. He attested that he did not disclose the
administrative order targeting Stewart or the lawsuit against Attorney's Title because he
had no knowledge of them. Id. at 369. Although he conceded that he knew that
Anderson had been convicted of a felony, he did not know the particulars of the
conviction. Id. at 351, 368.
In his defense, Mr. Wallace testified that he did not know he had a duty to disclose
the information that formed the basis of the charges, including his own bankruptcy. Id
at 367. He maintained that he had no idea what a Ponzi scheme was and that he acted in
good faith. Id. at 368-70, 373. Instead, he only became involved after he saw the
Program producing income and he learned that no one had ever indicated that the
Program was illegal despite the extensive investigations that the FBI, state agencies,
Brough, Udy, Van Roo, Fernau, Creer, and others had performed. Id. at 353-57, 368-70.
Although Mr. Wallace bought an expensive home and received monthly payments
through the Program, he ended up losing his home, vehicles, good credit, and thousands
of dollars that he and his siblings had invested. Id at 357-58, 361-62.
The prosecutor countered that the purchase agreements were securities, in
particular, investment contracts. R. 414: 416. She contended that Mr. Wallace
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misrepresented the nature of the Program when he claimed that the investors' money
would remain in the trust account and that the account would not be "encumbered." Id
at 419. Even more fundamentally, the prosecutor argued that the Utah Securities Act
imposed a duty on Mr. Wallace to check public records for lawsuits, investigate the main
actors' backgrounds and criminal histories, and to disclose that information to investors.
Id. at 422-26. According to the prosecutor, Mr. Wallace had the requisite "willful[]"
mental state because he had the "conscious objective" to perform the acts alleged in the
charges. Id. at 429.
During their deliberations, the jurors sent the trial judge a note with five questions
that all addressed Mr. Wallace's relative culpability. Id at 453. First, the jury asked if
Mr. Wallace had closed any real estate deals between 1999 and 2001 in which the seller
did not agree to join the Program, I d Second, the jury requested the date of Mr.
Wallace's first home purchase. Id Third, jurors wanted the dates of Mr. Wallace's other
home purchases that were not charged in this case but were alluded to in at trial. Id.
Fourth, jurors also wondered about Mr. Wallace's occupation before he began buying
homes. Fifth, they asked whether the State had charged Udy with any crimes. Id In
response, the trial judge simply instructed the jurors' to rely on their memories of the
evidence presented at trial. Id at 454-56.
After several hours of deliberations, the jury convicted Mr. Wallace of all charges.
Id. at 456-57. The trial judge sentenced Mr. Wallace to prison terms on all of the charges
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and ordered the sentences to run consecutively. R. 415: 10-11. But, he suspended the
prison terms and placed Mr. Wallace on probation. Id. at 11. In determining the length
of probation, the trial judge asked the prosecutor the length of Harrison's probation. Id.
When the prosecutor replied 12 years, the trial judge adopted the same term for Mr.
Wallace. IcL This appeal followed. R. 390.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State failed to present proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Wallace
willfully violated the securities laws. Those statutes require the State to show a willful
intent to violate the law. The Utah Criminal Code equates willful with the highest form
of criminal intent: intentional. The Utah Supreme Court's controlling decision on this
subject, State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993), supports this very requirement. By
definition, willful requires the State to prove that Mr. Wallace knowingly failed to
disclose material information to investors but consciously failed to do so.
The State presented no evidence to support that Mr. Wallace knew most of the
undisclosed information or that he was aware that this information was material. To the
contrary, the marshaled evidence affirmatively established that Mr. Wallace had a good
faith understanding how the investment operated and he relayed that information to
investors. He relied on his own and others5 investigations and the complete absence of
evidence of any illegalities. In fact, a former judge, several lawyers, real estate agents,
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government officials, and even police officers did not advise any of the participants to
avoid the investment nor did they conclude that the securities laws applied. In fact, the
FBI concluded that the investment contracts were legally meaningless. The only direct
evidence that the State produced of Mr. Wallace's intent showed that he honestly
believed the investment was legitimate, acted in good faith, and sought to keep all of his
promises.
The prosecutor misunderstood the intent requirement as shown in her closing
argument to the jury. Instead of making a case for the highly culpable intent of
willfulness, the prosecutor argued that Mr. Wallace should have investigated the
legitimacy of the investment more thoroughly and uncovered public documents about
Attorney's Title and its participants. But, this argument merely stated a case for criminal
negligence, the lowest form of mental state under Utah law. The prosecutor's proposed
negligent mental state implicitly conceded that the State could not even establish a
recklessness standard.
The evidence further failed to establish that Mr. Wallace knew of any duty to
disclose his bankruptcy or Anderson's prior conviction. Instead, Mr. Wallace did not
know the nature of Anderson's conviction that occurred over ten years previously. He
also honestly believed he had no duty to disclose his bankruptcy. Punishing Mr. Wallace
for these non-disclosures would unfairly fault him for innocent or accidental conduct that
turned out later to violate the securities laws. Such after-the-fact punishment violates
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basic notions of justice and fairness.
Because the evidence affirmatively established Mr. Wallace's innocence, this
Court should reverse his convictions. Generally, defense counsel must request dismissal
in the trial court to preserve the insufficiency of the evidence for appeal. But, counsel's
failure to do so here did not implicate the purposes of the preservation rule. Throughout
the proceedings, defense counsel asserted that Mr. Wallace lacked the requisite intent as
shown by counsel's requests for jury instructions. Then, the final instructions raised the
affirmative defense of lack of culpable intent. These actions fully informed the trial
judge of the defense theory and gave the judge an opportunity to dismiss the charges on
his own motion.
Even if defense counsel failed to preserve the insufficiency of the evidence, his
representation prejudiced Mr. Wallace's defense. Had counsel requested a directed
verdict or dismissal, Utah law would have required the trial judge to dismiss the charges.
Counsel's failure to seek dismissal, thus, directly resulted in the jury's guilty verdicts
when Mr. Wallace should have been acquitted.
Irrespective of the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial judge illegally sentenced
Mr. Wallace to 12 years of probation. The legislature prescribes sentencing judges'
limits in imposing probation. The probation statute plainly limits probation to 36
months. This Court should correct this illegal sentence and order the trial judge to
amend Mr. Wallace's excessive probation term.
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ARGUMENT
To convict Mr. Wallace of the securities violations, the State had the burden of
proving that Mr. Wallace willfully misrepresented the facts or that he failed to disclose
material information to the three investors. But, to convict Mr. Wallace, Utah law plainly
required the State to prove that Mr. Wallace actually knew of the material information
and then consciously misrepresented or failed to disclose that information to the
investors. Any other interpretation of the term willfully would impose a mere negligence
standard in violation of Utah law and due process principles. The record conclusively
establishes that Mr. Wallace did not know about the particulars of the scheme, the
administrative order forbidding Stewart from soliciting investors, or a civil suit against
Attorney's Title. Further, because Mr. Wallace knew that all of the investors were aware
of the risks involved in the Program, he did not willfully fail to disclose material
information. Likewise, Mr. Wallace did not willfully withhold information about his
bankruptcy or Anderson's conviction because he genuinely believed in the Program's
legitimacy. Because Mr. Wallace lacked the requisite mental state, trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a directed verdict at the close of the State's case and at
the end of all of the evidence. At the very least, this Court must order the trial judge to
amend the length of Mr. Wallace's probation because the judge illegally extended
probation beyond the 36 months allowed by law.
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I.

TRIAL COUNSEL PREJUDICED MR. WALLACE'S
DEFENSE IN FAILING TO REQUEST DISMISSAL OF
THE CHARGES FOR THE STATE'S FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH WillfulNESS, WHICH IS THE HIGHEST
MENTAL STATE UNDER UTAH LAW.

Because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Wallace
willfully violated the law, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request dismissal of
the charges. Willfulness requires the State to prove that a person knows of material
information and then misrepresents that information or fails to disclose it to investors.
But, here, the marshaled evidence demonstrates that Mr. Wallace either lacked
knowledge or acted in good faith. Instead of establishing willful conduct, the State, at
most, argued for a negligence or recklessness standard in support of the charges.
Because the State entirely based each charge on the wrong intent requirement, and given
the lack of evidence of intent, the trial judge was legally bound to dismiss the charges.
Thus, defense counsel's failure to request dismissal directly resulted in the jury's guilty
verdicts and constituted ineffective assistance.

A.

The Securities Act Requires the State to Prove
the Highest Mental State of Willfulness to
Establish A Securities Violation.

Utah law establishes a high standard to convict a person of securities violations.
Persons dealing in securities only commit a crime if they "willfully" violate the Utah
Uniform Securities Act (the "Securities Act"). Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (2000). In
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State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1358 & n.3 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court
rejected the defendant's request to read into the Securities Act an intent to defraud
requirement. Nevertheless, the Court held that willfulness denoted a "highly culpable
mental state." Id at 1360. Relying on the statutory definition of willful, the Court ruled
that a person acts willfully when "it is his or her 'desire to engage in the conduct that
cause[s] the result.'" Id at 1358 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103). The Supreme
Court had no occasion to apply that standard in Larsen because the defendant simply
asserted on appeal that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on a specific
intent to defraud. Id. at 1357.
In this case, the State first accused Mr. Wallace of securities fraud under Utah
Code Annotated section 61-1-1(2) for misrepresenting the Program and failing to
disclose material information. R. 414: 419-26. That subsection criminalizes making
"any untrue statements of a material fact or [] omit[ting] to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made in light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading

" Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-1(2) (2000). But, since

Larsen. no Utah appellate court has applied the willful intent requirement to situations
such as here where the defendant claims to lack knowledge of material information or
argues that he or she did not willfully omit material matters. In State v. Harry, 873 P.2d
1149, 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), this Court addressed the ban against failing to disclose
material information but the defendant in that case knew of the necessary information
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and did not act in good faith. No other Utah case has addressed this issue.
Nevertheless, the plain language of the statutory definition of a willful intent
establishes that Mr. Wallace did not act with the requisite mental state to commit any
securities violations. In interpreting statutes, this Court applies the plain language and
only looks to other methods of construction when the language is ambiguous. State v.
Norton, 2003 UT App 88, 1J13, 67 P.3d 1050. The Utah Criminal Code defines
u

[i]ntentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to

a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (2003) (emphasis added).
This definition of "willfully" plainly requires the State to establish that a person has a
"conscious" desire to act. Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-103(1) (2003). Webster's
defines conscious as "known to or felt by oneself." Webster's New World College
Dictionary 310 (4th Ed. 1999). Thus, to willfully misrepresent or omit material
information under the Securities Act, a person must be aware of the information and then
"know[j" that the information is material. Id
The Criminal Code's framework for defining the various mental states establishes
that willful is the highest form of intent under Utah law. The Code ranks mental states
from highest to lowest in terms of the necessary evidentiary showing:
§76-2-103. Definitions
A person engages in conduct:
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(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause
the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct
or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware
of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a
result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is
aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result
of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

§ 76-2-104. Culpable mental state - Higher mental states
included

(1) If acting with criminal negligence is sufficient to establish
the culpable mental state for an element of an offense, that
element is also established if a person acts intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly.
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(2) If acting recklessly is sufficient to establish the culpable
mental state for an element of an offense, that element is also
established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly.
(3) If acting knowingly is sufficient to establish the culpable
mental state for an element of an offense, that element is also
established if a person acts intentionally.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-103, 104 (2003).
Thus, Utah law equates willful with an intentional mental state. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-2-103(1) (2003). These provisions further demonstrate that a willful intent
requires a higher evidentiary showing than even "knowing[]" conduct. Id § 76-2-103(2)
(2003). Persons act knowingly when they are "aware that [their] conduct is reasonably
certain to cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2) (2003). Since, by statutory
definition, willfulness encompasses a knowing intent, a person who acts willfully
necessarily knows that the person's conduct is, at least, "reasonably certain" to bring
about a particular result. Id "Although the distinction between intentional [or willful]
conduct and knowing conduct is narrow, the statutory definition of these terms creates a
meaningful difference between the two." State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, ^[36, 82 P.3d
1106.
Larsen agrees that willfulness requires knowledge that a person's conduct will
cause specific results. In construing the term willful under the Securities Act, Larsen
held that the term "does not require an intent to violate the law or to injure another or
acquire any advantage." 865 P.2d at 1358 n.3. Instead, "[t]o act willfully in this context
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means to act deliberately and purposefully, as distinguished from merely accidentally or
inadvertently. Id Willful, when applied to the intent with which an act is done or
omitted, implies a willingness to commit the act, which, in this case, is the misstatement
or omission of a material fact." Id (citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court
concurs that, in criminal cases, willful requires '"the Government [to] prove that the
defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.'" Bryan v. United
States. 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998) fquoting Ratzlaf v. United States. 510 U.S. 135, 137
(1994)). Although this mental state does not require a specific intent to defraud, it does
mandate that persons have knowledge of material information and they either
misrepresented the information or failed to disclose it knowing that they needed to do so.
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1358 & n.3.

B.

Because Mr. Wallace Lacked Knowledge of
the Fraudulent Scheme, He Did Not
Misrepresent Material Information.

The prosecutor misunderstood the required mental state in arguing that Mr.
Wallace misrepresented the nature of the Program. To support her claim for
misrepresentation, the prosecutor claimed that Mr. Wallace falsely stated that investors'
money would remain in the trust account and that it would not be "encumbered." R. 414:
419. But, the prosecutor's assertions presuppose that Mr. Wallace knew that Stewart and
others would take money out the trust account. The State presented no evidence of Mr.
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Wallace's knowledge.
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, criminal defendants have a heavy
burden to marshal all of the evidence in support of the jury's verdict:
[Defendants] '"must marshal the evidence in support of the
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict/'1 State
v. Hopkins. 1999 UT 98.P14.989 P.2d 1065 (citation omitted).
Waldron's brief "must present, in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
[that] supports the very findings [it] resists." West Valley City
v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
State v. Waldron, 2002 UT App 175. ^[13. 51 P.3d 21.
The State's evidence showed that Mr. Wallace participated in the Program after he
watched Anderson and his family appeared to become wealthy over the course of 18
months. R. 413: 372-73. Mr. Wallace also contacted one of Anderson's first investors
and she represented that the Program operated as advertised and that she would
participate again if she could. IcL Nevertheless, Mr. Wallace did no further investigation
into Attorney's Title or the people involved in the Program. He did not check for public
records, contact regulatory agencies, or law enforcement officials. Nor did he determine
whether the investment agreements involved securities. Instead, he was lured by the
prospect of easy money and the promise of free homes.
Rather than conducting his own inquiry, Mr. Wallace relied on others to
investigate the legitimacy of the Program. Specifically, Udy stated that he and Brough
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had extensively researched the legality of the investments, including consulting the FBI,
the State Insurance Department, and the Utah Real Estate Commission. IJL at 243, 26264. Those investigations alerted Mr. Wallace of possible concerns about the Program's
legality. Most prominently, Brough and Udy informed him that they had encountered
loan fraud and that they had refused to complete home sales because of their concerns.
Id. at 232, 278. Further, the FBI an other government agencies would not affirmatively
approve of the Program because they were conducting ongoing investigations. Id_ at
227, 263. Despite the specter of law enforcement concerns, Mr. Wallace participated in
the Program based mainly on his own observations that others were making money.
But, this evidence does not establish that Mr. Wallace knew of the fraudulent
scheme or that he willfully or knowingly failed to disclose material information. If
anything, the marshaled evidence supports his good faith belief in the legitimacy of the
Program. Specifically, despite Brough's and Udy's extensive efforts, no one had ever
indicated that the Program was illegal or had advised them not to participate in the
Program. Id. at 262-64. Even the FBI stated that the investment agreements were legally
"meaningless." Id. at 263. In proceeding with all of Mr. Wallace's deals, Brough and
Udy communicated their beliefs that those deals were sound.
Moreover, Mr. Wallace knew that each of the sellers/investors performed their
own extensive investigations before agreeing to sell their homes and invest in the
Program. Van Roo asked two bank officials, a tax specialist, several real estate agents,
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and a lawyer to thoroughly review the investment agreement. R. 412: 93-94, 130-36.
All of these people stated their confidence in placing the money in an attorney trust
account and none of them described the investment as a security. Id, at 94, 133-37. Van
Roo also quizzed McAllister and Harrison about several issues that his lawyer had
suggested. Id at 109, 133. These investigations alerted him that the main risk was the
good faith of the Program's trustees. Id at 94. Nevertheless, after conducting these
extensive investigation, Van Roo invested in the Program.
Likewise, Fernau knew the trustees could abscond with the money. Id at 165-66.
He also consulted a retired Utah Supreme Court justice who then contacted Attorney's
Title directly. Id at 170. Justice Hall concluded that the Program was "very unusual"
but he did not advise Fernau against the investment or alert him that the Program was a
security. Id Relying on these assurances, Fernau invested in the Program.
As a licensed real estate agent, Creer was completely knowledgeable and familiar
with the investment program, including the possibility of the trustees stealing the money.
Id at 182. Nonetheless, she felt "comfortable" with Mr. Wallace personally and in the
investment itself. Id at 178, 182-83, 201, 212. She also consulted a lawyer and
discussed a list of talking points with Mr. Wallace before a completing the deal. Id at
184-86. Both she and her lawyer also believed that she was protected because the
Program's trustees would carry liability insurance. Id at 211. Based on her own
expertise as a real estate agent and her lawyer's advice, Creer invested in the program.
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The buyers5 investigations only confirmed Mr. Wallace's his own observations of
the Program's legitimacy. Brough's and Udy's investigations and their unwillingness to
engage in fraud cemented Mr. Wallace's conclusion. Thus, every indication supported
Mr. Wallace's good faith belief in its authenticity and legality.
Finally, all of the marshaled evidence that directly addressed Mr. Wallace's mental
state supports his good intentions. Mr. Wallace's only statement to Udy about his
intentions established that he "wanted to make sure that they didn't do anything that was
illegal. . . . " Id at 264. Consistent with this intent, Mr. Wallace was the only person
who tried to make the three buyers whole. Van Roo agreed that Mr. Wallace paid him
personally when Attorney's Title stopped payments and that Mr. Wallace's checks were
always good. Id. at 123-27. Despite losing his life's savings, Van Roo testified that Mr.
Wallace treated him not just "reasonable well, [but] very well." Id at 140. Fernau
similarly admitted that despite having had no contact with Fernau, Mr. Wallace called
him personally informed him about Attorney's Title's demise. Id at 162-63. Further,
Creer attested that Mr. Wallace made extensive efforts to return her investment and that
he was genuinely sorrowful. Id at 203, 213. Mr. Wallace even had his sister quit claim
the property to Creer in a failed effort to repay her. Id at 189, 205.
This evidence proves Mr. Wallace's good faith beliefs and honesty. The State
presented no evidence that Mr. Wallace knew of any fraud when he informed investors
that the money would remain in the trust account and that the banks would not encumber
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the money. Rather, he disclosed his actual understanding of the bank transfers including
his belief in Anderson's representations that Stewart could only transfer money if he had
a corresponding amount of funds in the trust account. R. 413: 99-100, 186-91, 372.
Even the State's own expert supports Mr. Wallace's good faith beliefs. The
expert testified at trial that money becomes "encumbered55 when someone has "some type
of property or lien interest55 in the money and has filed documents evidencing that
interest. R. 413: 334-35. The State presented no evidence that Mr. Wallace was aware
of such a property interest.
Rather than the marshaled evidence supporting the securities fraud convictions, it
actually proves Mr. Wallace's innocence. State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, ^|26-35, 79
P.3d 951. Because Mr. Wallace acted honestly and in good faith, the State failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Wallace "willfully," "consciously]," or even
"knowingly" misrepresented the bank transfers or that the trust account was encumbered
when he pitched the Program to investors. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61,1J5, 975 P.2d 501;
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-103(1), (2) (2003). The jury's questions during deliberations
strongly suggest that the jury had reservations about Mr. Wallace's culpability.
Specifically, the jurors requested details about Mr. Wallace's home purchases with the
Program, whether he had a job separate from the Program, and Udy's relative culpability.
R. 414: 453. These inquiries appear to cast doubt on the reasonableness of the jury's
decision to convict Mr. Wallace.
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For the same reasons, Mr. Wallace did not willfully fail to obtain a license to sell
securities or to register the Program as a security. These offenses, like the securities
fraud charges, require a willful intent. Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-3; 61-1-7; 61-1-21(a)
(2000). The record contains absolutely no evidence that Mr. Wallace believed he was
selling securities. In fact, even though numerous lawyers, real estate agents, tax
specialists, bank officials, law enforcement officials, and government regulators
reviewed the investment agreements, no one ever even hinted that the Program was a
security. R. 412: 130-37. Even Justice Hall did not recognize the investment as a
security. Id. at 170. Rather, by all accounts, the Program was a real estate purchase and
subsequent investment in an interest-bearing account. Again, the State's own expert
testified that purchasing a home and signing a mortgage note was not a security, but, was
"a commercial or a consumer transaction." R. 413: 331. Based on this understanding,
Mr. Wallace did not willfully fail to obtain a license or register the Program as a security.
Mr. Wallace emphasizes that he does not request this Court to establish a specific
intent to defraud under the Securities Act. The Utah Supreme Court plainly rejected that
issue in Larsen and Mr. Wallace does not revive it here. Rather, Mr. Wallace contends
that he lacked the intent to "willfully" violate the securities laws because he did not
knowingly or "consciously]" misrepresent the nature of the investment or otherwise fail
to adhere to the Securities Act. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (2003). This argument
relies on the plain language of the Criminal Code that requires the State to prove the
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highest form of mental state under the law. IcL; Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-21(a) (2000).
The Utah Supreme Court recently recognized this distinction when it explained
the difference between an intentional and a knowing mental state in deciding the mens
rea for attempted murder. In Casey 2003 UT 55, ^[37, 82 P.3d 1106, that Court held that
a person may know that dangerous conduct endangers others5 but at the same time lack
the "intent or conscious objective" to actually kill someone. Similarly, although the
Securities Act does not require defendants to actually intend to defraud others, the
willfulness requirement demands the State to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendants knew of material information but "consciously]" misrepresented that
information or failed to disclose it. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-103(1) (2003). The State
failed to do so here.

C.

The Prosecutor Erroneously Argued For A
Mere Negligence Standard Contrary to Her
Burden of Showing Knowing, Willful Conduct

Even more plainly, the marshaled evidence shows that Mr. Wallace did not
commit securities fraud because lacked any knowledge of Stewart's and Attorney's
Title's pending legal troubles. The prosecutor claimed that Mr. Wallace had a duty to
"find out" all he could about Attorney's Title and any of its associates to ensure the
legitimacy of the Program. R. 414: 425-26. She insisted that Mr. Wallace omitted
material information when he failed to search for all "public documents." hL
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Contrary to the "highly culpable mental state" of willfulness, the prosecutor's
arguments stated a case for mere negligence. Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1360. Criminal
negligence applies when a person "ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2103(4). In essence, the prosecutor argued that Mr. Wallace "ought to" have been aware
of a need to scour all government agencies and courts for red flags before he participated
in the Program. IcL
But, courts, including the Utah Supreme Court in Larsen, have rejected a
negligence standard in construing willfulness. 865 P.2d at 1358 & n.3; People v.
Mitchell 437 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Cox. 566 P.2d 935, 939
(Wash. CT. App. 1977). The prosecutor's argument does not even amount to a
recklessness standard. A persons act with reckless intent when they are "aware of but
consciously disregard^ a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or
the result will occur." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3). The prosecutor effectively
conceded that Mr. Wallace was "aware of but consciously disregarded]" the public
records when she claimed that if Mr. Wallace would have found material information if
he had looked for it. Instead, the prosecutor misapprehended the high mental state that
she was required to prove.
Because the prosecutor failed to establish that Mr. Wallace even negligently or
recklessly failed to disclose the actions against Stewart and Attorney's Title, she failed to
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show a willful omission that constituted fraud. IcL; Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-21(a)
(2000). As the Utah Supreme Court held in Casey, the failure to satisfy a lower mental
state necessarily prevents the State from establishing a higher intent. 2003 UT 55, ^[36,
82 P.3d 1106. Thus, the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt securities
fraud based the Stewart and Attorney's Title non-disclosures. State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d
561, 574 (Utah Ct App. 1991).

D.

Punishing Mr. Wallace For His Remaining
Failures to Disclose Would Unfairly
Criminalize Involuntary or Accidental
Behavior

Likewise, the State erroneously faults Mr. Wallace for failing to disclose his
bankruptcy and Anderson's prior conviction. In essence, the State argues that Mr.
Wallace had a duty to inform investors of these facts because that information was
material. R. 414: 426. But, materiality is not the standard for securities fraud. Rather,
the State had the burden of showing that Mr. Wallace "willfully" withheld information
that he knew was material. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21(2) (2000). Again, the evidence
fails to support such an inference.
First, Mr. Wallace testified that he was not even aware that his bankruptcy or
Anderson's conviction were even relevant. R. 413: 367-68. Although the investors
relied on Mr. Wallace to accurately represent the investment, he did not willfully fail to
disclose that information. Under the securities laws, a crime occurred only if he knew he
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had a duty to disclose and he willfully failed to do so. Mr. Wallace believed in good
faith that his was a personally matter that did not affect the legitimacy of the investment.
The State presented no evidence to show that Mr. Wallace had any other intent in failing
to disclose his bankruptcy.
Similarly, Mr. Wallace honestly believed he did not need to disclose Anderson's
conviction. That offense occurred in 1986, over ten years before the events unfolded in
this case. Further, the State presented no evidence that Mr. Wallace even knew the
nature of Anderson's conviction. Mr. Wallace only testified that he knew that Anderson
had been convicted of a felony but he was not aware that the conviction involved any
type of fraud. R. 413: 367-68. Given the staleness of Anderson's conviction and the
lack of any evidence of Mr. Wallace's understanding of it, Mr. Wallace had a good faith
basis for concluding that he had no reason to disclose the conviction.
Second, the willfulness requirement does not support penalizing these types of
non-disclosures. Under the State's view, persons violate the Securities Act "'even if, at
the time of the offer or sale, the seller had no reason to know that the unstated fact was or
might become "material"'" later. Comment, Christopher Joseph, Is Scienter an Element
of Criminal Securities Fraud in Kansas?, 48 Kan. L. Rev. 197, 212 (1999) (quoting
People v. Simon. 886 P.2d 1271, 1288 (Cal. 1995) (en bamc)). Such an interpretation
"violates the fundamental principle of not punishing innocent behavior . . . and stands
contrary to" the legislature's requirement limiting violations to "willful" conduct. Id.;
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see also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147 (1994) (due process bars penalizing
persons for innocent conduct). Common sense dictates that for an individual to willfully
M

omit to state a material fact, the individual must be aware of the fact, believe it is true

and material, and consciously choose not to disclose it." Joseph, 48 Kan. L. Rev. at 212.
Taking the State's approach to its logical extension would criminalize persons,
regardless of their intent, if they simply are aware that they are speaking. Id. at 210 &
n.90. Larsen specifically rejected this approach in ruling that willfulness "means to act
deliberately and purposefully, as distinguished from merely accidentally or
inadvertently." 865 P.2d at 1358 n.3. Because Mr. Wallace innocently withheld from
investors his bankruptcy and Anderson's conviction, he lacked the intent to willfully
omit material information. IcL

E.

Given the Absence of Evidence of Criminal
Intent and Trial Counsel's Failure to Object to
the Insufficiency of that Evidence, this Court
Must Reverse the Convictions.

Because the marshaled evidence supports Mr. Wallace's innocence, this Court
should dismiss all of his convictions. Although, generally, trial counsel must request
dismissal to preserve the insufficiency of the evidence, counsel below adequately alerted
the trial judge about the insufficiency of the evidence when he raised the affirmative
defense of lack of intent. This defense provided the trial judge a full opportunity to
dismiss the case regardless of a defense objection. Even if trial counsel erred in failing to
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request dismissal, he provided ineffective assistance in failing to object and allowing the
case to go to the jury in the absence of intent.
Although trial counsel failed to object to the sufficiency of the evidence on the
intent requirement, dismissal is still required. The Utah Supreme Court held in State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^fl6, 10 P.3d 346, that "as a general rule, a defendant must raise
the sufficiency of the evidence by proper motion or objection to preserve the issue for
appeal." Since the Hoi gate decision, no Utah appellate court had elucidated when the
"general rule" would not apply. I d ; see, e ^ , State v. Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, If 17, 37
P.3d 1180 (upholding Hoi gate's general rule). But, logically, the preservation rule
would serve no purpose when the policies underlying the general rule do not apply. This
appeal presents just such a case.
Requiring defense counsel to request dismissal serves the two primary goals of the
preservation doctrine:
First, as the trial court has no duty under statute or rule
to examine the sufficiency of the evidence unless the defendant
moves the court to do so or there is an "apparent" insufficiency,
the preservation rule ensures that the issue will be brought to
the trial court's attention and the trial court will have the
opportunity to address the issue. See [State v.] Eldredge, 773
P.2d [29,] 36 [(Utah 1989)]. Second, a general rule that
preservation is necessary in this context would prevent a
defendant from deliberately foregoing relief below based on the
sufficiency of the evidence, hoping that a remediable
evidentiary defect might not be perceived and corrected, thus
strategically facilitating the defendant's chance for a reversal on
appeal. See State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989).
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Hoigate, 2000 UT 74, ^[16, 10 P.3d 346.
But, in this case, the trial judge had a full opportunity to dismiss the charges
because the defense relied exclusively on the affirmative defense of ignorance and
factual mistake. Prior to trial, defense counsel submitted his proposed jury instructions,
including two instructions addressing Mr. Wallace's "good faith" and "honest" belief in
the legitimacy of the Program. R. 213, 214. The trial judge rejected those requests and
instructed the jury, instead, on the affirmative defense of "ignorance or mistake of fact
which disproves the culpable mental state required for th[e] crime" charged. R. 342;
413: 397; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304(1) (2003).
These circumstances show that the trial judge was fully aware of Mr. Wallace's
defense of a lack of intent. The jury instructions brought the sufficiency of the evidence
to the trial judge's "attention." Hoigate. 2000 UT 74, ^fl6, 10 P.3d 346. The jury's
questions about Mr. Wallace's culpability further notified the judge that this case turned
on intent. Further, several provisions under Utah law authorize judges to dismiss the
charges on their own motion. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (2003); Utah R. Crim. P. 17(p),
23, 24(a) (2004). The trial judge, thus, had a full "opportunity" to dismiss the charges
based on insufficient evidence. Hoigate. 2000 UT 74,^[16, 10 P.3d 346.
Further, this case raises no concern for trial counsel strategically refusing to object
to increase the chances of victory on appeal. Id. As trial counsel's requested jury
instructions clearly establish, counsel's defense relied on the absence of intent
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throughout the proceedings below. Thus, he did not strategically fail to raise the intent
issue. Instead, he addressed it head on and alerted the trial judge of the defense theory.
Because a request for dismissal served neither of the preservation rule's policies,
this appeal does not fall under the general rule requiring an objection. Instead, the
evidence supported Mr. Wallace's good faith and prevented the State from proving any
of the securities violations which required willful intent. Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1; 611-3; 61-1-7; 61-l-21(a) (2000). "[I]t is fundamental that the State carries the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of an offense, including the absence of
an affirmative defense once the defense is put into issue." State v. Martinez, 2000 UT
App 320,1f9, 14 P.3d 114 (quoting State v. Hill. 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986)); see.
also Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-501(1), 502(2)(b) (1999) (defining burden of proof). As
detailed above, the State not only failed to prove willfulness, the marshaled evidence
affirmatively established Mr. Wallace's innocence on the securities violations. The
dismissal even extends to the racketeering charge because the securities fraud
convictions formed the basis for that offense.
Even if the defense theory and the jury instructions did not preserve the
insufficiency of the evidence, trial counsel prejudiced Mr. Wallace's defense in failing to
request dismissal. Defense counsel is ineffective when he or she acts below an objective
standard of reasonableness and the deficient performance prejudices the defendant. State
v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Defense counsel provided deficient
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representation because the law generally required him to preserve the insufficiency
argument in trial court. State v. Hoi gate. 2000 UT 74,116, 10 P.3d 346. Here, trial
counsel requested a directed verdict after the State rested based only on venue and lack
of jurisdiction. R. 413: 337-38. He failed to argue that the absence of evidence of
willful intent. Then, counsel failed to request dismissal at the close of the defense case in
further violation of the preservation rule. Id. at 374.
Trial counsel's omissions prejudiced Mr. Wallace because both the marshaled
evidence and the jury's inquiries about Mr. Wallace's culpability provided firm legal
bases for dismissal upon a proper motion Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 23 mandates
that "upon motion of a defendant [trial judges] shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved
or admitted do not constitute" a crime. Utah R. Crim. P. 23 (2004). Utah Code
Annotated section 77-17-3 similarly requires that, ,f[w]hen it appears to the court that
there is not sufficient evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith order
him discharged." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (2004). In contrast, dismissal on the
court's own motion is merely permissive when the defense fails to request the court to
dismiss. Utah R. Crim. P. 23; Hoigate, 2000 UT 74, T|16, 10 P.3d 346. Thus, had trial
counsel moved for a directed verdict or a dismissal after the State's case or at the close of
all of the evidence, the trial judge would have been required to dismiss the charges for
lack of a willful intent. Counsel's failure to do so, plainly prejudiced Mr. Wallace
because it directly resulted in Mr. Wallace's convictions instead of a full acquittal.
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II.

THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPOSED AN ILLEGAL
SENTENCE WHEN HE ORDERED MR. WALLACE TO
SERVE 12 YEARS ON PROBATION.

Irrespective of the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial judge violated Utah law in
imposing a 12-year term of probation. Trial judges only have the authority to sentence
which the legislature provides them. Because Utah law limits probation to three years,
the trial judge's sentencing decision plainly exceeded his statutory authority.
In Utah , "the legislative branch possesse[s] the power to fix punishment for
crimes, as long as the punishment [i]s not cruel or unusual." State v. Green. 757 P.2d
462, 463 (Utah 1988). "[W]hile courts possess judicial discretion in the sentencing of
defendants, the power to define crimes and fix the punishment for those crimes is vested
in the legislature." IdL Regarding probation, "the power to suspend sentence in favor of
probation [is] not inherent in the judiciary but must be authorized by statute." Id. at 464.
Thus, the plain language of statutes control the trial court's sentencing authority. Id_
In imposing a 12-year term of probation, the trial judge mistakenly assumed that
he could impose probation consecutively. R. 415: 11. The Criminal Code provides trial
judge discretion to "sentence a person convicted of an offense" "to pay a fine;" "to
probation;" "to imprisonment;" or to any combination of those "sentences." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (2003). Further, Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-401(1) provides
trial judges discretion "to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences" when a person
has been convicted of more than one offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (2003).
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But, Utah law does not specifically address whether the "sentence" of probation under
section 76-3-201(2) includes the power to impose probation consecutively under section
76-3-401(1). Absent an "express provision" authorizing consecutive terms of probation,
sentencing judges lack authority to "stack" probation in that manner. State v. Pakula.
547 P.2d 476, 478 (Ariz. 1976).
Nevertheless, because the plain language of the probation statute limits probation
to 36 months, this Court need not construe any of these provisions to determine the
maximum length of probation. Green, 757 P.2d at 463. That statute clearly directs trial
judges to "terminate^" probation "upon completion without violation of 36 months
probation in felony" cases. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) (2003). If the legislature
wanted to allow trial judges to impose probation consecutively, it could have included
that proviso in the probation statute. Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1360. Its failure to do so
reinforces the plain reading of the statute. Id.
The decision in Green further supports this plain reading. In that case, the State
contended that it could revoke the defendant's probation at any time as long as the
defendant committed a violation within the probation period. Green , 757 P.2d at 463.
The Utah Supreme Court ruled that this construction created the "absurd result[]" of
keeping the defendant in "a perpetual state of limbo." Id. at 464. That Court held that
the State's reading would obviate the certainty and regularity created by the statute and
ignore the plain meaning of the word 'terminate.'" Id_
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Likewise, allowing the trial judge to impose 12 years of probation violates the
probation statute's plain requirement to "terminated" probation at the end of 36 months.
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(10)(a) (2003). Allowing trial judges to exceed this statutory
limit would undermine the legislature's "power to define crimes and fix the punishment
for those crimes...." Green, 757 P.2d at 463. To the contrary, trial judges must respect
the limits to their sentencing discretion as established by statute and apply the "plain
meaning" of the term terminate. Id.
Further, as Green points out, this reading fully comports with the trial judge's
stated goal in imposing the 12-year probation term. The trial judge expressed his intent
to ensure that Mr. Wallace and the other co-defendants returned the investors' money. R.
415: 11-12. Accordingly, he allotted the attorneys 60 days to agree to a restitution
payment schedule "that doesn't set Mr. Wallace up to fail but at the same time recognizes
the severity of the charges of which he was convicted." IcL_ at 12. To ensure that Mr.
Wallace paid restitution, the trial judge imposed court-supervised probation and
instructed the attorneys to return the matter to him after the 60 days even though he was
being reassigned to preside in Summit County. IcL The judge was so concerned about
restitution, he offered to return to the district court in Salt Lake County for a day just to
establish Mr. Wallace's payment schedule. IcL
As was the case in Green, the trial judge failed to recognize that the probation
statute already provided a mechanism for monitoring Mr. Wallace's restitution payments.
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Green held that trial judges can maintain supervision over probationers beyond 36
months "'if fines or restitution or both are owing.5" 7 57 P.2d at 465 (quoting former
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-l(7)(c)). Under current law, trial judges similarly can extend
probation if "there remains an unpaid balance" on the probationer's account for courtimposed costs such as fees, surcharges, and restitution payments. Utah Code Ann. § 7718-l(10)(a)(ii)(2003).
Thus, the trial judge did not need to impose a 12-year probation period to ensure
that Mr. Wallace paid restitution. Instead, he could have imposed the statu tor ily-limited
term of 36 months and then continued court supervision until Mr. Wallace completed his
restitution payments, even beyond 12 years, if necessary. In contrast, the judge
misunderstood the restitution statute and imposed an illegal sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Wallace requests this Court to reverse his convictions based on insufficient
evidence or the ineffective assistance of counsel. At the very least, this Court should
remand this matter to the trial court and order the trial judge to amend Mr. Wallace's
sentence to 36 months of probation.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Addendum A

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 021910910 FS

GERALD STEVEN WALLACE,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DENO HIMONAS
September 27, 2004

PRESENT
Clerk:
marcyt
Prosecutor: BARLOW, CHARLENE
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SIMMS, CLAYTON A
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 10, 1960
Video
Tape Number:
11:20
CHARGES
SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition 08/12/2004 Guilty
SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition 08/12/2004 Guilty
SECURITIES FRAUD (amended)
2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition 08/12/2004 Guilty
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY
3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition 08/12/2004 Guilty
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT
3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition 08/12/2004 Guilty
PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY
2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition 08/12/2004 Guilty
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Case No: 021910910
Date:
Sep 27, 2004
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of SALE OF UNREGISTERED
SECURITY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY
a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 021910910
Date:
Sep 27, 2004

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The counts in this case are consecutively.

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 144 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay restitution in the amount of $62 6,0 00 jointly
and severally.
Counsel and defendant will form a stipulated plan of payment within
60 days. If a stipulation cannot be reached, a hearing will be
set.
Restitution is to be paid directly to the Attorney General's
Office.
The Court appoints LDA for any appeals defendant may make.
Defendant is not to act as a fiduciary in the State of Utah.
Defendant is barred from the involvement/execution of any real
property transactions as either a principal or as a third party
with the exception of the sale or acquisition of his primary
residence.
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Addendum B

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1. Fraud unlawful
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale,
or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.

Addendum C

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. Penalties for violations
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully
violates any provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1
and 61-1-16, or who willfully violates any rule or order under
this chapter, or who willfully violates Section 61-1-16
knowing the statement made to be false or misleading in any
material respect.
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1:
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the crime
was committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully
obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less than $ 10,000;
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if:
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money,
or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was
worth $ 10,000 or more; or
(ii) (A) at the time the crime was committed, the property,
money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained
was worth less than $ 10,000; and
(B) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly
accepted any money representing:
(I) equity in a person's home;
(II) a withdrawal from any individual retirement account; or
(III) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan as
defined in the Internal Revenue Code; or
(c) is guilty of a second degree felony punishable by
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than three
years or more than 15 years if:
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money,
or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was
worth $ 10,000 or more; and

(ii) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly
accepted any money representing:
(A) equity in a person's home;
(B) a withdrawal from any individual retirement account; or
(C) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan as
defined in the Internal Revenue Code.
(3) No person may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule
or order if he proves that he had no knowledge of the rule or order.
(4) In addition to any other penalty for a criminal violation of
this chapter, the sentencing judge may impose any penalty or
remedy provided for in Subsection 61-l-20(2)(b).

Addendum D

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3. Licensing of broker-dealers,
agents, and investment advisers

(1) It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this
state as a broker-dealer or agent unless the person is licensed
under this chapter.
(2) (a) It is unlawful for any broker-dealer or issuer to employ
or engage an agent unless the agent is licensed. The license of
an agent is not effective during any period when he is not
associated with a particular broker-dealer licensed under this
chapter or a particular issuer.
(b) When an agent begins or terminates a connection with a
broker-dealer or issuer, or begins or terminates those
activities which make him an agent, the agent as well as the
broker-dealer or issuer shall promptly notify the division.
(3) It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this
state as an investment adviser or as an investment adviser
representative unless:
(a) the person is licensed under this chapter; or
(b) the person's only clients in this state are investment
companies as defined in the Investment Company Act of
1940, other investment advisers, federal covered advisers,
broker-dealers, banks, trust companies, savings and loan
associations, insurance companies, employee benefit plans
with assets of not less than $ 1,000,000, and governmental
agencies or instrumentalities, whether acting for themselves
or as trustees with investment control, or other institutional
investors as are designated by rule or order of the director; or
(c) the person has no place of business in this state and during
the preceding 12-month period has had not more than five
clients, other than those specified in Subsection (3)(b), who
are residents of this state.
(4) (a) It is unlawful for any:

(i) person required to be licensed as an investment adviser
under this chapter to employ an investment adviser
representative unless the investment adviser representative is
licensed under this chapter, provided that the license of an
investment adviser representative is not effective during any
period when the person is not employed by an investment
adviser licensed under this chapter; or
(ii) federal covered adviser to employ, supervise, or associate
with an investment adviser representative having a place of
business located in this state, unless such investment adviser
representative is licensed under this chapter or is exempt from
licensing.
(b) When an investment adviser representative required to be
licensed under this chapter begins or terminates employment
with an investment adviser, the investment adviser shall
promptly notify the division.
(5) Except with respect to investment advisers whose only
clients are those described under Subsections (3)(b) or (3)(c),
it is unlawful for any federal covered adviser to conduct
advisory business in this state unless such person complies
with the provisions of Section 61-1-4.

Addendum E

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7. Registration before sale

It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this
state unless it is registered under this chapter, the security or
transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14, or the security
is a federal covered security for which a notice filing has been
made pursuant to the provisions of Section 61-1-15.5.

Addendum F

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. Definitions
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause
the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct
or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware
of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a
result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is
aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result
of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

Addendum G

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or
law
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact
which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any
prosecution for that crime.
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning
of a penal law is no defense to a crime unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably
believed his conduct did not constitute an offense, and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's
reasonable reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order
or grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by
law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion
of a court of record or made by a public servant charged by law
with responsibility for interpreting the law in question.
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may
constitute a defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless
be convicted of a lesser included offense of which he would be
guilty if the fact or law were as he believed.

Addendum H

Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3. Discharge for insufficient evidence
When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient evidence
to put a defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith order him discharged.

Addendum I

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 17(p)
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at
the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order
dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof,
upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included
offense.

Addendum J

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 23. Arrest of judgment.
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon
its own initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall,
arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute
a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is
other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting
judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the
offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a
commitment until the defendant is charged anew or retried, or
may enter any other order as may be just and proper under the
circumstances.

Addendum K

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24. Motion for new trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own
initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is
any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect
upon the rights of a party.

Addendum L

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501. Presumption of innocence "Element of the offense" defined

(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof,
the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence ofjurisdiction and venue are not elements of
the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of the
evidence.

Addendum M

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-502. Negating defense by allegation or
proof- When not required
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense:
(1) By allegation in an information, indictment, or other charge;
or
(2) By proof, unless:
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a result of evidence
presented at trial, either by the prosecution or the defense; or
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has
presented evidence of such affirmative defense.

Addendum N

Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-201(2)
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may
sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the
following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole;
or
(f) to death.

Addendum 0

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive
sentences — Limitations ~ Definition (in relevant part)

(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged
guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to impose
concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. The court
shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of
judgment and commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or
consecutively to each other; and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or
consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already
serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run
concurrently or consecutively, the court shall consider the
gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of
victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of
the defendant.

Addendum P

Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(10)
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the
discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of
36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or
12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation
period under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid
balance upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue
the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of
enforcing the payment of the account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the
account to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection,
prosecutor, victim, or upon its own motion, the court may
require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay
should not be treated as contempt of court.
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the
Office of State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in
writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised
probation will occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report
and complete report of details on outstanding accounts
receivable.

